

## **The Securitization of Development Cooperation. The Case of Selected Central and Eastern European Countries**

**The main aim of this project is to track the securitization of development cooperation.** However, I do not use this term strictly as presented originally by representatives of the Copenhagen School. Development cooperation is not „the issue presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure”<sup>1</sup>. It is not perceived as a threat in itself, but as a tool for securitizing problems that have been included in the development agenda. In other words, development cooperation implements the donors’ interests related to security. Securitization understood in this way may manifest itself, for example, through political declarations related to the reasons for undertaking aid activities, justification of aid activities in strategic documents, directing ODA to specific beneficiaries, the method of shaping priorities to be achieved through ODA.

Two hypotheses will be verified: **securitization impacts development cooperation; securitization has a dominant impact on development cooperation** (especially its programming, the practice of providing aid, and patterns of allocations). It will be necessary **to answer the following research question: What is the impact of securitization on development cooperation?** Answer will be given based on **an analysis of development cooperation implemented by selected Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC)**. Case selection was based on the project of the most similar systems. According to that principle, the following countries were selected for analysis: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. All these countries in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, during the refugee and migration crisis that affected Europe, clearly opposed the EU plans to welcome immigrants from Africa and the Middle East, seeing this case as a significant threat to their security (e.g., as a growing prospect of terroristic threat and as a threat resulting from the cultural differences of newcomers). They called for on-the-spot help and tackling problems at their source, which can be read as a “speech act” in the development cooperation securitization process. These issues were also reflected in their official aid programmes and aid allocation patterns. However, their security motivations had already appeared earlier – in the early 2000s – although they were not so vivid.

The knowledge gained in the analysis course will allow **identifying ways of combining issues related to security and development cooperation** (its programming, practice, aid allocations). Thanks to this, it will be possible **to develop a model for measuring the securitization of development cooperation**. The constructed **model will use qualitative and quantitative data** (not only about selected CEE countries’ ODA, but also datasets on threats and risks for national and international security). The constructed model will be tested on the examples of donor countries, and then consulted with experts dealing with development issues. This will allow for the correction of possible errors and the improvement of the model to make it universal and useful for researchers dealing with the securitization of development cooperation.

The research, based on **qualitative and quantitative methods**, will be carried out in three main phases:

- **phase 1** – query in the MFA’s archives, national libraries, and research centres that have in their resources source materials on development cooperation;
- **phase 2** – analysis of documents according to the principles of studying the securitization process presented by the Copenhagen School, which will allow defining the links between security-related issues and development cooperation;
- **phase 3** – measuring the securitization of the theory and practice of development cooperation in selected CEE countries.

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<sup>1</sup> B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, London 1998, p. 23-24.