

The aim of the project is to survey the problems concerning the notion of *folk psychology* understood as a theory, that is the theoretical framework built out of the terms referring to different types of mental states which is responsible for competences connected with so-called ‘mindreading’ (that is, skills such as an ability to explain, interpret or predict the mental states and actions of other subjects). The problem of the status of folk psychology as a theory so understood became especially explicit in light of the formulation of the broadly discussed eliminativist arguments, aiming at proving that the theory responsible for ‘mindreading’ is defective and – as such – it should be rejected and replaced by an alternative. The radicalism of eliminativist claims causes that the problem of a theoretical status of folk psychology undertaken in the project acquires a special significance. The investigations will aim at ascertaining whether the eliminativist arguments rightly assume that folk psychology is a theory and at surveying *what type* of a theory it might be. The research can be divided into two main areas:

Firstly, the issue of a *type of a theory* folk psychology is supposed to be will be addressed. Two stances shall be analyzed: the one claiming that folk psychology is a deductive-nomological theory, that is: a theory consisting in a set of laws supplied with the information about the world and allowing to infer deductively the explanations and predictions regarding cognitive agents; another one stating that folk psychology is a theory based on the mental models constructed by a subject and that ‘mindreading’ abilities rest on comparing those models with the object observed. Another problem which shall be addressed within this area is the problem of the *nature of folk psychological laws*. Alternative possible stances regarding this problem will be surveyed: inter alia, those which compare folk psychological laws to scientific empirical laws and those which argue for distinctness of folk psychological laws by appealing to their peculiar normative or constitutive characteristic.

Secondly, the issue of *internalization* and *tacitness* of folk psychology shall be analyzed within the project. In the considerations on folk psychology there often appears a thesis that the theory responsible for ‘mindreading’ has a tacit nature. It means – approximately – that a subject equipped with a theory does not have a direct cognitive access to the claims of the theory. The project will analyze the notion of a tacit theory. The analysis shall include the question about what exact dispositions to reconstruct the claims of a tacit theory are to be required from a subject of a folk psychological theory. Moreover, the notion of a tacit theory will be examined in the context of the dispute between two accounts of ‘mindreading’ called *theory-theory* and *simulation theory*. The question shall be asked to what extent can simulation theory explain the capacity of ‘mindreading’ without a stipulation of some amount of tacit theory on side of a ‘mindreader’ and therefore – whether the two theories are in fact competitive.

The direct effect of the research shall be a PhD thesis in English and several papers.