

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Social Normativity

The aim of this project is to formulate a distinctively Wittgensteinian approach to thinking about the facts and phenomena of the socio-political reality of human life. Wittgenstein's understanding of language and philosophy might help us address some vital confusions and mythological preconceptions of social and political thought. Moreover, it might offer us an unorthodox conception of social normativity that is not necessarily discursive (i.e. is not an outcome of rational communication). This approach to social normativity directs our attention and grants a normative character to such significant – and vividly discussed – aspects of our socio-political lives as emotions, affects, feelings and perception.

This project focuses on three closely related issues. Firstly, it explores Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and his philosophical method(s), and proves its critical potential by application to some tendencies in social and political philosophy. Secondly, it interprets the rule-following remarks and conceives normativity as observable regularity. Thirdly, it discusses the issues on the intersection of philosophy of action and perception as significant for a genuine description of our socio-political practices.

The objectives of this project are directly related to the method it applies. My reading of Wittgenstein is anchored in the *New Wittgenstein* interpretations represented by Cora Diamond, James Conant, Alice Crary and Juliet Floyd, among others. In this project I claim that the main problem in the current research – in the New Wittgenstein's framework – is to demonstrate normativity and critical potential of Wittgenstein's philosophy. This project's **hypothesis** is that this normativity and critical potential can be found in Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks and his philosophy of perception. Furthermore, to demonstrate it would be tantamount to formulate a new approach to social philosophy, and social normativity in particular, because those two groups of remarks are directly related to the issue of social practices. Moreover, a second important feature of the New Wittgenstein interpretations is taking seriously the meta-philosophical remarks and recognizing Wittgenstein's own understanding of what he was doing in philosophy as crucial to an understanding of what is important in his work. A significant part of this project is devoted to the development of Wittgenstein's philosophical method(s) and his conception of philosophy. Wittgenstein formed his philosophical method(s) and conception of philosophy in contrast to his former views. Therefore, those remarks have a massive critical potential that can be applied to social and political philosophy. Furthermore, those remarks are illuminating also in this way, that Wittgenstein criticized his former philosophical views, by using his new philosophical method(s). Therefore, those remarks not only show what kind of doing of philosophy is confused or going astray, but also, by showing it, they illustrate Wittgenstein's own philosophical approach. Insofar as the main objective of this project is to formulate a philosophical approach to the issues of social philosophy consistent with Wittgenstein's views, those remarks constitute significant hint both, of how such an approach should and should not look like.

Notwithstanding Wittgenstein's indifferent or even negative attitude toward political philosophy, I shall argue that his avowed opposition pertained only to the possibility of a certain kind of social explanations, therefore, it should not be understood as repudiation of social and political philosophy as such but, rather, as a belief that we are in the dark about how to do social and political philosophy. This project not only assumes that Wittgenstein's philosophy can provide an answer for our understanding of socio-political reality, but also that Wittgenstein's thought can contribute to the contemporary debates within social and political philosophy in a distinct and attractive way.