

## **Brentano, Representationalism, and the Early Modern Problem of Intentionality**

The category of intentionality is one of the most important conceptual tools elaborated by the philosophy of mind to characterize consciousness. On its standard account, an essential feature of consciousness is to be “directed towards something” or “being about something”, i.e. to be intentional. The category of intentionality was introduced to the philosophy of mind in this technical sense by Franz Brentano (1838-1917), in his seminal work, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874). The basic research hypothesis to be verified in the project is a distinction between terminology of intentionality (derived from the late scholasticism), the problem of intentionality (elaborated by early modern philosophy), and the concept of intentionality (formulated by Brentano). The project attempts to detect how much the discussions between representationalism and anti-representationalism, as an effect of the early modern scientific revolution, shaped the Brentanian concept of intentionality and led to the synthesis of the terminology, the problem, and the concept of intentionality. This genealogy of intentionality aims to provide a deeper understanding of a conceptual role of intentionality played by this category in the contemporary discussions of the philosophy of mind. The project constitutes the first systematic, monographic attempt of a reconstruction of the early modern history of intentionality.