

The goals of the project are twofold: first, to analyse the usefulness of two psychological concepts - intuition and insight - in the reconstruction of the unconscious cognitive processes in legal thinking, and second, to relate the outcomes of the above mentioned analysis to a number of traditional conceptions in legal epistemology. The main research hypotheses of the project are:

1. Unconscious cognitive processes are essential for providing a comprehensive picture of legal cognition; these fall into two distinct but interrelated categories: intuition and insight.
2. Some traditional conceptions of legal thinking - in particular Joseph Hutcheson's conception of *hunch* as well as *legal hermeneutics* - can be re-interpreted in an informative way against the backdrop of the psychological research pertaining to legal intuition and insight.

To verify aforementioned the Author conduct a detailed investigation of the phenomenon of 'insight' and its usefulness for the theories of legal reasoning. Since there is no study containing such an analysis, the project is pioneering for legal epistemology, and its impact on the development of legal theory should be significant. As stated in the project's main goals and hypotheses, neither purely heuristic-based theories, nor the sole concept of *insight*, provide a satisfying clarification of the unconscious cognitive processes in legal thinking. This claim seems to be strongly supported by the psychological research into *insight*, as well as by a critical analysis of the current psychological research into legal intuition. As the project's second hypothesis states, the traditional conceptions of legal thinking (e.g. Joseph Hutcheson's conception of *hunch*, or *legal hermeneutics*) can - and should - be re-interpreted in an informative way against the backdrop of the psychological research pertaining to *legal intuition* and *insight*. Since there is hardly any consideration of the phenomenon of *insight* in such theories, the significance of filling this lacuna seems to emerge within the legal domain. As Bob Harbort concludes (1997, p. 134): "we must either come to understand what we mean by intuition or replace it with something else (...)".