

**Popular science abstract**

The phenomenon described by contemporary theorists as economic intelligence and espionage is to some extent amorphous – i.e. it is perceived by the lens of numerous definitions along with mutations. Next to the strict scientific-technical intelligence (STI) one can enumerate intelligence in the area of commerce, banking system and finance market, private equity and state controlled industry, natural resources etc. The stealing or copying of ideas one from another accompanies mankind since the beginning of civilisation and determines economic and technological progress worldwide as an aspect of dissemination of know-how across cultures and nations. The institutionalisation of intelligence gathering and its entanglement in the structure of the state, respectively entrepreneurship is however the matter of the XVIII and XIX centuries along with the genesis of organized science, establishing of laboratories, data bases and professional associations of researchers. In subsequent XX century we observe dynamic growth of the knowledge's accumulation on the one hand, and increasing legal regulation of patent rights and intellectual property on the other hand.

First half of the XX century was marked by massive expansion of the STI, in particular in the military area. Till now the Soviet penetration into the US atomic program embodies the most spectacular success of STI ever. The second half of the century resulted in the rapid build-up of STI branches inside of security and intelligence services, both in the NATO and Warsaw Pact blocks. For instance CIA established Division for Science and Technology. American think tanks started to track down with growing anxiety Soviet headway in microelectronics and computer science.

Project's main objective is to present the impact of scientific-technical intelligence (STI) on selected, innovative areas of research and development and branches of industry in Polish People's Republic (PPR), as electronics, informatics and automatic control, pharmacy and biotechnology, as well as machines' construction in years 1956-1989. The scientific problem aimed to be solved in the project is answering the question, whether the maintenance of expanded - regarding the structure, manpower and in the result budget – STI organisation, brought the expected benefits to the Polish economy. Was the investment in illegal activity worth it? Apart of expenditures on training and employment of tens (than hundreds) of intelligence officers working on overt and covert positions in- and outside of the country, there was also the need for financing sophisticated operations abroad, often including setting up fake companies. Moreover the Ministry of Internal Affairs had to keep up hundreds of secret collaborators, consultants and some other auxiliary personal. Those mentioned experts were responsible for defining requirements for the Polish science and industry, and – after successful smuggling of technology – for evaluating of obtained documents, patterns, samples and devices, finally for the “legalisation” of intercepted solutions by submitting Polish patents and implementing them in the Polish plants. The phenomenon of STI becomes even more fascinating when it comes to payment for agents of Polish intelligence - probably the most money-consuming aspect of black market operations. It seems namely that the financing of those purchases was almost entirely covered by the funds earmarked for the R&D in the individual ministries that “ordered” certain solution. On the other hand there were of course significant benefits generated by the STI – savings resulted from know-how “for free” transmission and so called “reverse engineering” without any licensing costs. Moreover the acquisition of some technologies was impossible not for the money reasons but because of embargo restrictions imposed by US government, approved by members of the Coordinating Committee for the Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) and respected by other countries as Austria or Malaysia. In such a case scenario STI was an indispensable tool for the government. Finally there was a third option for taking advantage of STI: trade negotiations with the OECD states. Numerous examples convincingly prove that involvement of STI in purpose of figuring out real notions and intensions of contractors, - for instance their readiness to price reductions or other concession, - could result in economizing of hundreds of thousands or even millions of USD when the final agreement had been signed up. Next to the operations authorized by the Polish government or party leadership Polish STI and in effect economy, profited from the achievements of spy-networks working for the remaining Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) countries. Polish STI shared its knowledge with partners from Soviet KGB's foreign intelligence, East German HVA, as well as with other intelligence services, especially Czech, Bulgarian and Hungarian, but also from non-European countries of Comecon, as Mongolia, Vietnam and Cuba. Those ties included reciprocity certainly.

The research will include the analysis and interpretation of existing scientific literature on STI, textual documents stored in the state archives in Poland, Russia and Germany, as well as oral testimonies of former insiders of PPR's R&D, industry and security apparatus.

So far we do not dispose of similar work that would have approached and explained the question of Polish STI. Therefore project launched by the author aspires to be a pioneer one. The core of the sources that are going to be analyzed in the course of upcoming years make files of First Department of Ministry of Internal Affairs, produced before 1991. Most of them have been declassified and disclosed after 2006 (the process is continuing), so that they have been barely explored by the historians so far.