

One of the most frequently asked question by the analytic philosophers of language is "what distinguishes meaningful expressions from physical objects?". We ask why some stains of ink or noises are considered as linguistic expressions and some other are considered merely physical objects or phenomena. Philosophical theories of meaning make attempts to answer that kind of questions.

The research proposed in this project is designed to investigate the nature of meaning. The research will be rather an attempt to specify how we should construct philosophical theories of meaning than propose such a theory.

Recently the idea that meaning is an essentially normative notion became very popular among philosophers of language. It was assumed that the meaning of linguistic expressions produce obligations as how we ought to use these expressions. Such an account have faced powerful critique because it has counterintuitive consequences (for instance, it assumes that we ought to always speak the truth).

The aim of the research to be conducted is to save the thesis that meaning is an essentially normative notion by changing its content. We plan to formulate an alternative interpretation that thesis: we claim that it is rather the case that linguistic meaning is a product of rules for use of expression than that the meaning produces obligations as how we ought to use the language.