

Research project will be focused on the new and crucial questions which concern the human condition today: What about the impact of biotechnological modifications on individual identity and self of the modified persons? (for example, retardation of aging processes through stem cells application, body rejuvenation, fostering cognitive abilities via men-computer interface). How do our "self" and "identity" deal with such challenges and changes? Can Robert Kegan's theory of the "evolving self" be extended to the new developmental stage which requires coping with the effects of modifications (for example, with radical rejuvenation, sex reassignment surgery effects)? Firstly, the researcher aims to identify both positive and negative (ambivalent) effects of biomedical human enhancement by analysing case studies. She handles the effects as facilitators of dissociation and disintegration of the "embodied self" (Giddens 1991). Dissociation and disintegration can enable persons to adapt changes and "otherness" in a way K. D. Brown already described in his writings. Secondly, the researcher asks how can self and the identity be strengthened and empowered: She elaborates new methodologies by drawing ideas from B. Waldenfels' (2006), H.-G. Gadamer's, and M. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological approaches of self and identity in order to show how can "me" as a passive/suffering instance transition to an active (agent- and subject-like) "I". The "I" is enabled to deal with modifications. However, it needs to be empowered. Yet researchers mostly focussed on biological aspects of human enhancement. The applicant, by contrast, focuses on its mental aspects, in particular, on personal self and identity. In the third section of her project two opposing models of human self will be examined: The narrative-diachronic model by Paul Ricoeur on the one hand, and the episodic model by D. Parfit, G. Strawson, I. Persson etc. on the other hand. The episodic model presupposes discontinuity and enormous plasticity of human self and identity as well as rejection of causality principle. The applicant aims to recombine both of models, and to propose the new model which allows to redefine the self as being able to the new self-identifications repeatedly (as Ricoeur claims in *De soi-meme comme l'autre-oui*). It is to expect from the self it becomes able to identify alterations and otherness which do not stem from the world around and the interactions with others but they originate from intentionally and deliberately performed biotechnological modifications (human enhancement). The applicant states that human self, trained at recent stages of its evolution reconstructed by R. Kegan (1983) is equipped with internal capacity to a further evolution, even under conditions of modified memory, cognition, emotions. Changes can challenge and strengthen this capacity. Applicant's reasoning way has to demonstrate that even in the age of posthumanism claiming that "postpersons" and "transhumans" may live "beyond selves" (Braidotti 2013, Agar 2014) no human being will be deprived of the self, regardless of how strongly it has been modified, filled with bionic (artificial) organs and limbs, or how far it is a becoming machine-like. In contrast, machines that became more like a human being still do not possess any selfhood and identity. The project responds to the alarming question if "the end of humanity" is coming soon (Agar 2012).